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Article 3

In Defense of Whole-Brain
Definitions of Death
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A.A. Howsepian, M.D.

The author received his medical degree in 1987 from the University
of California (Davis) and, at this writing, is a Ph.D. candidate at the
University of Notre Dame.

I.
The primary thesis that I shall undertake to defend is this: All
functions of the entire brain must be irreversibly lost in order for a
(neurodevelopmentally mature) human being to be dead. This is, by
some lights, a remarkable undertaking. Robert M. Veatch, for
example, finds such an undertaking to be literally incredible, for he
imagines that, far from defending this thesis, no one really believes
l
any such thing. According to Veatch, the "whole brain definition of
death" (WBOO) so construed2 as well as related whole-brain
definitions have sustained irreparable conceptual damage at the hands
of their critics and, hence, ought to be discarded. aut the death of
whole-brain definitions of death has been grossly exaggerated. I
intend to argue that, contrary to appearances, (i) critics of WBOsO,
including Veatch, o. Alan Shewmon, Michael Lockwood, and John
H. Sorenson, have not presented an even remotely plausible case
against their conceptual viability and (ii) the alternative ("higherbrain-oriented") definitions of death (HBOOsO) advanced by Veatch,
Shewmon, Lockwood, Sorenson and others are so defectively
conceived that even ([WBOsO were in conceptual disarray, we would
have no good reason to adopt any extant higher-brain-oriented
definition alternative.
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II.

The fundamental conception of death delineated in the
Uniform Determination of Death Act targets "irreversible cessation of
all functions of the entire brain stem," as a sufficient condition for
human death. 3 What, precisely, does it mean to say that "all functions
of the entire brain" have ceased irreversibly? Veatch appears
sympathetic to the idea that brain functions can include the functions
of certain isolated nests of neurons. Commenting on a quote by
4
neurologist James Bemat , Veatch states that, "The idea that
functions of certain ' isolated nests of neurons' can remain when an
individual is declared dead based on whole-brain-oriented criteria
certainly stretches the plain words of the law that requires, without
qualification, that all functions of the entire brain must be gone. ,,5
Is it the case, as Veatch claims, that Bernat has stretched the
plain words of the Uniform Determination of Death Act? According
to Veatch, Bernat has introduced some sort of "qualification" that
unduly restricts the plain words of the law. But has he? Not by my
lights, for it appears clear to me that functions of isolated nests of
neurons are not brain functions at all, just as isolated nests of living
cellls do not (and, in fact, could not) mediate any bodily functions in
the absence of a living body.
Veatch is committed to the view that the irreversible cessation
of all higher brain functions is sufficient for the death of mature
human beings. Now if Jones is dead then it appears that, according to
Veatch, what is left (although perhaps in name only6) is Jones' s dead
body, unless Veatch is committed to a view of death (a view that is
apparently affirmed by John H. Sorenson 7 in which it is coherent to
speak of Jones the human being as being dead but of Jones' s body as
continuing to live. s If this is Veatch' s view then while alive, both
Jones and his body are alive. But is this what Veatch really means to
say? Is, for example, Jones' s living body a human organism? If it is
not, then what sort of organism could it possible be? Its phenotype
and its genotype are, after all, clearly human. But if it is a human,
and if it is a human distinct from Jones (call it Jones*), then while
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alive it appears that Jones was in fact a composite of two humans:
Jones the human being and Jones·, the human organism.
In order to avoid the sorts of complications suggested above9 ,
let us suppose that what Veatch means is that if Jones dies, so does
his body, i.e., that there is no living organism called Jones's Body that
is somehow distinct from Jones. Then, given the differential death
rates of different tissues after organismic death, we would expect to
find some living cells amidst all those cells that once (but no longer)
composed Jones's living body. But these living cells do not subserve
any bodily functions; for to sub serve a bodily function is to subserve
some function of a living body. No living body, no bodily functions,
for dead bodies have no functions to be subserved. 1o
11
Similarly, dead brains have no functions to be subserved.
The WBDsD defender will, at this point claim that brains which boast
only isolated nests of functioning cells are not subserving any brain
functions at all, for there is no living brain present with any functions
for these cellular processes to subserve. The burden of proof at this
point appears to be on Veatch: Just what sorts of brain functions does
he imagine such nests of neurons to subserve?
It would be a mistake to insist, without argument, that for a
brain to be dead all of its parts must be dead. Veatch doesn't
obviously fall for any such fallacy of decomposition but he skirts
awfully close to this when criticizing defenders of WBDsD on the
grounds that they have somehow compromised their position by
accommodating som.e minimal amount of brain cell life in their
conceptions of whole brain death. I conclude, therefore, that Veatch
has failed to demonstrate that either Bernat or any other like-minded
defender of WBDsD has anything to be ashamed of in holding that
whole brain death is compatible with the presence of neuroelectrical
activity generated by isolated nests of living neurons.

III.
According to Veatch, a satisfactory HBODD alternative to
WBDsD would take the following fonn: "[Olne is dead when there is
irreversible loss of all 'higher' brain functions.,,12 In agreement with
Lockwood 13 and Sorenson, Veatch considers "consciousness" to be
an uncontroversial element in this proper subset of brain functions.
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41

In order to simplify our discussion, I shall, in what follows, focus
solely on Veatch's problematic understanding of consciousness as it
relates to his version of the HBODD.
Veatch claims that judgments concerning the presence or
absence of human consciousness can be made with "similar or greater
levels of accuracy,,14 than judgments concerning the presence or
absence of brain death. An attempt is made to support this surprising
claim by invoking the following three bodies of evidence: (1) "The
literature on the persistent vegetative state repeatedly claims that we
can know with great accuracy that consciousness is irreversibly
IOSt.,,15 (2) "The AMA's Councils of Scientific Affairs and Ethical
and Judicial Affairs have concluded that the diagnosis [of persistent
vegetative state] can be made with an error rate of less than one in a
thousand.,,16 (3) "In fact the President's Commission itself said that
'the Commission was assured that physicians with experience in this
area can reliably determine that some patients' loss of consciousness
is permanent. '" 17
Concerning (1): How precisely can we know this "with great
accuracy"? Consider, for example, permanent persistent vegetative
state (PPVS) patients. Given the stipulated permanence of this state,
the patient who is accurately diagnosed with PPVS will die a PPVS
patient. And given its purported vegeiative nature, genuine PPVS
patients will not display any behavioral indices which might signal
the presence of consciousness. There is, therefore, simply no
conceptual space in this context for one successfully to detect the
presence of consciousness. Contra Veatch, the fact of the matter is
this: If an alleged PPVS patient were conscious, we would seem to
have no way to detect this. But if this is so, then regardless of what
the literature "repeatedly claims," we have no good reason to follow
it on this point. IS
In point of fact, Veatch's selective canvassing of the
neurology literature has failed to focus on a critical item in the
persistent vegetativ.e state (PVS) corpus, viz. the important and
apparently dissenting (early) views of Bryan Jennett and Fred Plum,
the neurologists who initially gave PVS its name. 19 According to
Jennett and Plum, "Initially the EEG [of PVS patients] may be
isoelectric, but considerable activity and even alfha rhythm may be
found once the state has lasted many months.,,2 In fact, it is well
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known that the EEGs of some PVS patients, especially later in their
Given these bits of
clinical course, are essentially norma1. 21
neurophysiological data and given the fact that Jennett and Plum are
alive to the possibility "that a continuum must exist between this
vegetative state and some of the others described,,22 - most notably
between PVS and locked-in states in which full-blown consciousness
awareness coexists with extensive skeletal muscle paralysis - it is
clearly premature at best to claim with confidence that, with regard to
PVS patients, "We can know with great accuracy that consciousness
is irreversibly lost.,,23
Concerning (2): This is relevant to the present discussion only
if the proper diagnosis of PVS is incompatible with the presence of
consciousness in one who has been so properly diagnosed. But as
noted above, this incompatibility has not been demonstrated, nor is it
at all clear how it could be demonstrated. 24
The theoretical point at issue bears some further examination.
There are, on the one hand, particular locked-in patients who
exemplify full-blown SUbjective awareness; and there are, on the
other hand, particular PVS patients who experience no phenomenal
darkness. Now, Veatch (and almost everyone else in this discussion)
would, it seems, like for us to believe that there are no graded,
intermediate states. The claim simply put is this: Everyone who
appears to be unconscious and who appears to be unarousable from
this apparent state of unconsciousness by ordinary means either is in
possession of full-bodied conscious awareness (and hence is lockedin) or is wholly unconscious; the graded levels of consciousness that
apply to all those individuals who do not appear to be unconscious
simply do not apply to those individuals who do appear to be
unconscious. Jennett and Plum had properly resisted this outrageous
dichotomy, but since the appearance of their seminal paper on PVS
almost everyone else25 has rushed to embrace it. Why?
One obvious answer to this question is as follows: To think
otherwise would be to ensnare clinicians in a web of complexity and
uncertainty that is repugnant both to those intellects which demand
simplicity and to the exigencies of smooth clinical practice. Not
surprisingly, the impetus behind this kind of answer can also be
traced to Jennett and Plum: "[I]t seems wise to make an absolute
distinction between patients who do make a consistently
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understandable response to those around them, whether by word or
gesture, and those who never do.,,26 Nothing is said in defense ofthis
principle except that "it seems wise."
But wise from what
standpoint? Surely not from the standpoint of the truth-seeking
intellect to which Jennett and Plum were so careful earlier to draw to
our attention; but, rather, from the standpoint of clinical expediency.
What else is one to do knowing that something must be done, but not
knowing the nature of those variables essential to sound decisionmaking in this context? Jennett and Plum' s answer falls far short of
being a paradigmatic deliverance of practical judgment; rather it is
unreflective and incautious at best.
Concerning (3): Of course some physicians can reliably
detennine that some patients will remain unconscious until their
deaths (consider, for example, some of those moribund tenninally ill
patients who, in virtue of some untoward developmental event,
possess only a myelencephalon). But the real question is whether
some physicians can reliably detennine whether or not a significant
number of patients diagnosed as being in persistent vegetative states
are conscious.
IV.

When all is said and done, Veatch is not all that interested in
assessing the degree to which one can make accurate loss of
consciousness detenninations, for his most fundamental concern is
not a practical but a theoretical one, namely, a concern about what it
is to be dead. As we have noted, his claim is that to be a dead human
is to suffer the irreversible loss of a certain proper subset of brain
functions, viz. , higher brain functions. The technological feasibility
of accurately discerning states of brain death so conceived is
irrelevant to this theoretical claim.
What then is Veatch' s
justification for the conceptual propriety of adopting this new,
controversial conception of death?
The argument -sketch offered by Veatch (as best I can
reconstruct it) goes something like this: Any conception of human
death that neglects to take seriously the crucial role played by
consciousness in human life appears, essentially, to be arbitrary. For
instance, it appears to be an arbitrary assignment of metaphysical
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priority in any conception of human death to assign, e.g., mere brain
stem function such priority over mere spinal cord function. The only
plausible nonarbitrary delimiter of human death is the presence or
absence of the capacity for consciousness. And given that death is, in
some important sense, irreversible, it is the irreversible loss of this
capacity for consciousness that is the central feature of human death.
Call this argument-sketch "VAS."
Veatch attempts to display the plausibility of VAS'
conclusion by claiming that it is intimately connected with "classical
Judeo-Christian notions that the human is essentially the integration
of the mind and the body and that the existence of one without the
other is not sufficient to constitute a living human being. 27 But this is
a confusion. The dominant classical Christian conception of the soulbody unit has relied most heavily on Aristotelian-Thomistic
hylomorphic schemes in which the psyche (or "soul") is thought to be
the form of the body.28 But clearly, what we mean by the term
"mind" is not what they meant by the term "soul." According to both
Aquinas and Aristotle it is possible to be ensouled but not minded. It
is true that, according to all those adherents of hylomorphism of
whom I am aware, no living body could exist uninformed and that a
human body's form, even if it could exist independently of the body,
would not then, in itself, constitute a living human being. The
important point here, though, is this: It does not at all follow from
widely embraced Christian variations on Aristotle' s hylomorphism
that being severely brain damaged and, in virtue of this, being
permanently unconscious (or even irreversibly unconscious, if
"irreversibility" in this context is indexed merely to the current level
of technology) until death is incompatible with being rationally
informed (and, thereby, rationally ensouled). I shall argue for this
point in greater detail in Part VI.

v.
It might appear up to this point that I have rejected the
HBODD only to have embraced the UDDA' s29 whole-brain
definition in its stead. This appearance is misleading. I do not, in
fact, embrace the UDDA ' s definition of death. Rather, I am, in this
essay merely defending this conception of death (and variations on it)
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against some of its most radical and vociferous critics. As noted in
the opening line of Part II, the unDA identifies death with
irreversible cessation of all brain functions. If I, on the other hand,
were to endorse any conception of brain death at all, I would find
most plausible the thesis that the death of mature human beings is
intimately tied to the loss of all brain functions. Obviously, I see a
distinction between the notions of "loss" and "cessation" in this
context. Prior to discussing this important distinction, I need first to
say a few words about the notion of irreversibility, for I am also not
convinced that any reference to the irreversibility of the processes in
question is an essential constituent in a properly composed definition
of human death.
David J. Cole, in his provocative and insightful essay, "The
Reversibility of Death," eloquently expresses a core intuition
concerning human death that pace Veatch is shared by, among others,
Christian theists, viz. that human death it reversible. 3D The Christian
tradition, for example, is essentially grounded in the resurrection of
Jesus, the exemplar of that victory over death which is the hope of all
Christian believers. Cole identifies such reversibility with our
"ordinary" concept of death and, given this alleged commitment,
avers that this ordinary concept is inconsistent with standard medical
definitions which entail death's irreversibility.
Cole points out that the notion of irreversibility is ambiguous
between what he calls "strong" and "weak" irreversibility, the former
denoting processes which cannot be reversed and the latter denoting
processes which are merely not now reversible. He argues that both
senses of irreversibility as they are presently applied to the notion of
human death pose insurmountable epistemic and moral problems and,
hence, ought to be rejected. A protracted discussion of his arguments
for these conclusions, although tempting, is beyond the scope of this
essay.
I do, though, want to examine Cole's proposed characterization of the ordinary concept of death. According to Cole, "A
being is dead if it both (a) does not currently display essential
processes and (b) is incapable of resuming them itself in the ordinary
course of nature conducive to its lifeform. ,,31 Although Cole does not
provide a perspicuous, satisfying explanation of how to understand
this characterization, on its most straighforward reading I find Cole's
46

Linacre Quarterly

characterization deficient on several counts. I shall mention only
two: First, Cole's definition of death does not capture what I take to
be certain features of the ordinary concept of death that Cole appears
to have overlooked, e.g., that a significant number of ordinary people
have not died and returned from the dead a number of times.
Consider an individual who is in asystole (and, hence, who does not
currently display certain essential, specifically cardiovascular
processes) and is resuscitated with assistance (e.g., with the help of
cardiopulmonary resuscitation, CPR). Some individuals have been
thus revived with CPR a number of times and it seems plausible to
believe that many of these individuals would not have revived
without this intervention and, hence, are properly characterized as
being incapable of resuming these essential cardiovascular processes
themselves. On Cole's conditions, such individuals would have
actually died a number of times. But this would be anything but an
ordinary way of understanding what is going on in these situations.
Second, condition (a) is ambiguous between essential
processes (whatever precisely those are ) that have merely ceased and
essential processes that have been destroyed. This distinction can
adequately be conveyed as follows: Take what appears to be a
representative essential process, for example, those processes
governing the functioning of the breathing centers in the brainstem.
Suppose that person S is cryogenically preserved such that all
functions of S' s entire brain merely cease. It does not follow from
this that such a state of hypothesized suspended animation (in which
no brain processes at all are operative) constitutes a state of death.
Thus, I along with a small but significant group of thinkers32 have
come to reject the identification of irreversible cessation of all brain
functions with the death of developmentally mature human beings,
opting instead for a conception of human death that requires the
destruction (or what I earlier called loss) of all functions of the entire
brain, where such destruction is the end result of processes by which
the structural substratum (i.e., the matter) that underlies the
functional unity of the organism disintegrates in virtue of a loss of the
organism's principle of organization (i.e., its/arm).
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VI.

Veatch is not alone in advocating a significant alteration in
brain death criteria based principally on philosophical considerations. One of the most provocative critics of WBDsD and a
fellow advocate of a radical redefinition of death similar to Veatch's
is physician D. Alan Shewmon, M.D. 33 Veatch and Shewmon are
united in their advocacy for the position that not only PVS patients,
but also certain advanced Alzheimer's patients are dead.
Shewmon is slow to ease the demented into the domain of the
dead. He begins by mounting what he takes to be sound arguments
for ( i ) why ' his conception of brain death constitutes death of a
human organism, and ( ii ) why some PVS patients are, in spite of
initial appearances, actually human cadavers. Only then does he
address the vital status of the demented. We shall examine each of
these arguments in turn.
Shewmon begins by invoking a number of concepts which he
claims to have borrowed from Aristotle and Aquinas. Specifically, he
discusses what he understands to be their hylomorphic schemes for
conceptualizing living organisms. (A thorough discussion concerning
whether or not Shewmon has done justice to the doctrine of
hylomorphism is beyond the scope of this paper.)
Shewmon first asks us to consider a case in which a human
person's brain and body are dissected apart - spatially disconnected
one from the other - such that the brain is kept alive artificially in a
fluid-filled vat (as philosophers are wont to have it) and the body is
kept alive artificially by way of a sophisticated life support system.
According to Shewmon, the resulting envatted brain is
identical with the live person prior to the dissection and the "body" is
clearly something more than a mere aggregate of individual
fibroblasts and other types of cells[.] It possesses a certain degree
of functional unity at the vegetative level. In other words, it is a
vegetative organism in its own right, with its own substantial
form . At the moment of separation from the body (now only the
brain), this form became actualized from its previous virtuality in
the spiritual soul, just as in the case of the fibroblast.
Now this brainless vegetative substance, which looks
like a human body but is not, is exactly what one is dealing with
in a case of brain death . The only difference is that, with the

48

Linacre Quarterly

latter, the agent which removed the brain was not a surgeon but
nature. In our macabre laboratory, it is evident that the person
will die, not when we disconnect the respirator from the
vegetative human-looking organism, but when we disconnect the
machines from the floating [en vatted] brain. It should therefore
be equally evident that, in the natural context, a person will die
(and his spiritual soul will leave the body) the moment his brain
dies, irrespective of whether the rest of the body maintains some
vegetable integrity or not. 34

But why should we think this? First, it is crucial to point out
that not only is the "body" being kept alive by artificial means in
Shewmon's scenario, but the brain also. Thus, it does not appear that
it is the artificiality of the life-sustaining mechanisms that is guiding
Shewmon's intuitions here.
Shewmon would draw the same
conclusions, it seems, even if neither body nor brain required
artificial life support.
Shewmon's dialectical strategy is curious: He intends to
defend his position on brain death by invoking an odd methodological
admixture derived from those philosophical strategies which have
traditionally been employed by Aristotelean-Thomistic natural
philosophers on the one hand and Parfitian metaphysicians on the
other. A pure Aristotelean or Thomist would certainly be suspicious
of Shewmon's appeal to contemporary Parfitian thought experiments
(which even Shewmon calls "bizarre,,35) with their accompanying
(apparent) confidence that imaginability is a reliable guide to
possibility, a principle which Medieval natural philosophers (along
with a few contemporary philosophers36) would certainly have
rejected. At any rate, in spite of this methodological tension, I shall
next argue that even granting Shewmon's method of hypothetical and
extraordinary cases, it is not at all obvious that Shewmon's
conclusions follow.
Shewmon argues that the artificially sustained living body
(ASLB) which results from the envatting of S's brain is merely a
vegetative organism (what Shewmon has called a "brainless
vegetative substance,,37) with its own substantial form, for "It
possesses a certain degree of functional unity at the vegetative level. 38
One can, of course, agree that an ASLB "possesses a certain degree of
functional unity at the vegetative level," and hence agree that it is a
living organism but deny that it is merely a vegetative organism. 39
November, 1998
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Might not an ASLB possess a rational soul rather than a mere
vegetative soul?
One might advance the following two reasons for answering
this question in the negative. First, one might think that because an
ASLB is, as Shewmon describes it, a "brainless vegetable substance,"
it could not possess a rational soul. Although I intend to take up this
objection in much greater detail elsewhere, I shall here say this much:
First, contrary to Shewmon's use of terms, an ASLB is not obviously
brainless - any more than Barney Clark died heartless, or any more
than one who possesses two prosthetic arms is armless. If the notion
of a brain is, as it appears to be, primarily a functional notion, then
any material "thing" that functions as a brain in the biological
economy of a living organism is a brain. 4o But if this is so, and if one
of the chief functions of the brain is its role in mediating organismic
unity, then an ASLB is not obviously a brainless vegetable substance.
Second, it is arguably the case that having a brain as a part is
not a necessary condition for a live organism's being rationally
ensouled. Consider, for instance, human zygotes and preembryos.
Neither of these organisms, we are told, have brains as parts and both
of these organisms, according to the dominant Christian tradition, are
ensouled organisms. But if this is so, then Shewmon is simply
mistaken in thinking that:
The notion that the brain is the crucial organ which
detennines the body's compatibility or incompatibility with the
human soul is also perfectly consistent with the tradition of the
Catholic Church regarding the baptism of two-headed infant
"monsters." For centuries, it has been considered proper to
administer two baptisms absolutely if the monster had two chests
and heads. If there were two chests and one head, or one chest
and two heads, there would be one absolute and one conditional
baptism. Thus, even long before medical science clarified the
respective functions of the heart and the brain, the Church had
manifested its openness to the possibility that the brain alone
could be the critical organ for detennining the presence or
absence of a human soul. If there should be two baptisms, then it
also follows that death of one of the heads would constitute the
death of a person, even though the body it was attached to
remains alive (as his sibling's body).
The notion of brain death as death of the person is
therefore perfectly in keeping with the Church's traditional
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criteria for enumerating souls in the context of bizarre medical
circumstances. 41

To claim, as Shewmon does, that the brain alone is the crucial
organ for determining rational ensoulment in the Catholic tradition
based on her baptismal practices regarding birth defective infants is to
confuse necessary conditions with conditions that are sufficient. All
that the aforementioned example could plausibly be interpreted as
showing is that having a live human brain as a part is a sufficient
condition for possessing a rational soul, not that it is a necessary
condition.
Third, one might argue thus (as van Inwagen appears to
42)
argue : An ASLB could not be a human person because the envatted
brain which was formerly a part of the ASLB is a human person and
it is not logically possible for both the ASLB and the envatted brain
to be distinct persons who are identical with the predissected person,
for then two distinct persons would be (numerically) identical with a
single person and that is impossible.
Here is an alternative way of stating the argument: Suppose
that Jones at to is composed of a body and brain, that at t\ (where t\ is
later than to ) Jones' s brain is removed and envatted, and that Jones' s
body is kept alive using an artificial brain. Where is Jones at t\? The
absurdity comes in thinking that the very same being who was Jones
at to is, at t\ two distinct beings, viz. an envatted brain and an ASLB,
for surely one entity cannot be numerically identical with two entities.
Surely all of that is right. But why think that this is an
accurate metaphysical description of the aforementioned dissection?
Here are what I take to be two other genuine possibilities:
(i) The result of the dissection results in only one scattered
person. Jones continues at t\ to be identical with both his brain and
his body (which are not distinct organisms). His brain and body may
be biologically disconnected, but they are informed by one and the
same soul. This suggestion is, as it stands, radically non-Aristotelean
and non-Thomistic, at least as those positions have been traditionally
understood, for without an organic unity which governs both Jones' s
body and Jones' s brain, it does not seem that a single hylomorphic
soul could inform them both (although perhaps a Cartesian soul
could).
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(ii)The dissection results in two persons one of which is
distinct from Jones: Jones, who is now identical with the envatted
brain and a distinct person, namely, and ASLB that is not merely
vegetative (and not merely a heap of living and dead unicellular
organisms), but that is infonned with its own rational soul that is
distinct from Jones's. Just as it is possible for an human (pre)embryo
to be rationally ensouled but not presently able to cogitate, so too it
seems possible that an ASLB, whose integrity is sustained through
the workings of an artificial brain, is also rationally ensouled,
although not by the same soul that ensouls Jones, the result being that
this ASLB is a human being who is distinct from Jones.
VII.

Shewmon's argument for the conclusion that PVS patients
are, in spite of initial appearances, human cadavers infonned with
vegetative souls depends, in part, on focusing upon that group of
persistent vegetative patients who do not, and never will, possess a
conscious mental life. 43 Call this set of patients "pennanently
unconscious PVS" (PUPVS) patients. These patients, according to
Shewmon, are actually the cadavers of the human persons who they
once were. But again, his argument for this conclusion is not
compelling. For neither lacking cerebral hemispheres nor being such
that one is pennanently unconscious is sufficient for non-personhood
given a plausible interpretation of, for instance, Aquinas's
hylomorphism.
Consider a set of human preembryos which are frozen for
purposes of experimentation and later are killed. These preembryos,
prior to their freezing, neither possessed cerebral hemispheres as parts
nor was there any moment in time at which they were conscious. Yet,
at least a significant number of Christians, whether they be neoCartesians or Thomists (or something else), appear to have good
reason for thinking that such live human preembryos are human
persons.
One could, of course, reply that there is a serious disanalogy
here, for it is the case that these preembryos possess at least a natural
potential to be conscious. It is simply a matter of fact that they are
52
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not and will never be conscious, whereas the PUPVS patient lacks
even this natural potential for consciousness. In fact, this is how
Shewmon does argue:

What is necessary for the human soul is not the actual functioning
of the essential brain structures, but their natural potential for
functioning. Someone who is asleep is not dead, even though the
functions of intellect and will are suspended. This is because they
are only temporarily interrupted; there is no structural damage to
the neural substrate, rendering the brain intrinsically incapable of
those functions .... [A] brainless embryo is quite unlike a brainless
adult, since the substantial form of the embryo makes its
development always tend toward forming those brain structures
essential for the operation of the intellect. .. [W]hen the critical
areas are destroyed in an already formed brain, they cannot be
regenerated, and the body is thereby rendered permanently
incompatible with the human essence.44

But is this so?
Here we must be very careful for surely if it is the case that
human persons do survive the alterations that are characteristics of
PUPVS, then PUPVS patients do possess the potential for
consciousness because prior to succumbing to PUPVS, they were
conscious. Consider in this light the following argument: Suppose
that Jones is a human organism at time to. Next, suppose that (in
virtue of being rationally ensouled at to) Jones is engaging in
conscious rational thought at to. Further suppose that at time tl Jones
lapses into a PUPVS state and that Jones at tl is the same organism as
Jones at to. If Jones possesses a rational soul, then it is a necessary
fact about Jones that he possesses a rational soul (since the rational
soul of a thing constitutes the essence of a thing). Therefore, if Jones
possesses a rational soul at to it is also the case that Jones possesses a
rational soul at tl. And if Jones possesses a rational soul, then Jones
possesses a natural potential to be conscious. Hence, if Jones
possessed a natural potential to be conscious at to, then Jones
possesses a natural potential to be conscious at tl' Clearly Jones
possessed a potential to be conscious at to, for Jones (by supposition)
was engaging in conscious rational activity at to (such activity being

November, 1998

53

in accord with Jones's rational nature). Therefore, Jones (while in a
PUPVS state) possesses a natural potential to be conscious at tl.
I am sensitive to the fact that this argument gives the distinct
appearance of begging a number of questions. Perhaps it does
(whatever precisely it means to "beg the question"). In any event, the
argument does highlight one principal point of contention between
Shewmon and myself: Shewmon believes that Jones at tl is not the
same enttty as Jones at to, and I believe that this is false. In light of
the fundamental nature of our disagreement, I here present a second
attempt at mounting an argument against Shewmon: Jones was at one
time a non-brained non-conscious person. Hence, being Jones is
compatible with being a non-brained non-conscious person. Further,
Jones who was a non-brained non-conscious person possessed (at that
time) the natural potentiality for becoming a brained conscious
person. This would have been true even if Jones were never to have
become a brained conscious person. But if x has a natural
potentiality to be y, then it is a necessary truth about x that x has a
natural potentiality to be y. Hence, if Jones survives the alterations
that result in a PUPVS condition, then PUPVS-Jones has the natural
potentiality to be a brained conscious person. 45
Live humans, for example, (unlike rocks) possess the natural
potentiality for sight, and necessarily so. Even a man who has
undergone bilateral enucleation, or one who is congenitally blind, has
this natural potentiality (i.e., even if one does not see after some time
t or one does not see at all, the natural potential for sight remains). It
is, I am claiming, a necessary truth about the kinds of things live
humans are that they have the natural potentiality to see. It is, in
short, a part of the essence of human beings that they possess just this
sort of perceptual potency. Along similar lines, rational animals (i.e.,
human beings) possess the potentiality to be wise (even severely
mentally retarded - or, more to the point, severely demented humans possess this natural potentiality) and, in like manner, they
possess it essentially.
VIII.

Shewmon next extends his account to include the severely
demented Alzheimer's patient, i.e., one who has undergone the
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destruction of those parts of one's brain which are essential for the
proper functioning of one's intellect and will. In such cases,
Shewmon asserts, only the animal soul, which earlier was merely
virtually present in the spiritually en souled organism, is now there
present. Just as in the PUPVS case, Shewmon claims that the person
does not survive this neuroanatomical insult, but only a "humanoid"
animal:
Patients at this stage of the illness have sensory
perception and can move around, but do not speak or show
any evidence of intellectual understanding of their
surroundings; their behavior is governed totally by primitive
impulses. "Dementia" is really an excellent term for this
state, since it indicates that the mind is no longer there. The
body has been rendered incompatible with the human
essence, so a substantial change must have taken place. The
spiritual soul must have left the body, so that the person is
now in the next life, while an animal which looks like the
former person remains on earth. 46

Shewmon has adopted quite a curious stance here. Why does
he think that the body of a severely demented patient "has been
rendered incompatible with the human essence"? Does he really
believe that no in-principle technological advance could possibly
restore occurrent rationality to a severely demented human being or,
perhaps, that even God could not inform that sort of a body with a
rational soul?
Evidently he at least affirms the former belief, for he later
argues that cerebral atrophy (a hallmark of certain forms of severe
dementia) is "intrinsically irreversible; i.e., ... we can ... rule out the
possible development of some future technique of making the nerve
cells regrow, or of transplanting nerve cells which will make the
proper synaptic connections, etc. ,,47 His argument for this position
depends on the following controversial assumption: The maintenance
of S' s identity from time t to later time t* requires that S at t* possess
some of the sa.rne memories and basic personality structures as S at t.
He adds that these features of one's identity are encoded in the
patterns of one's neuronal connections and he thinks it impossible for
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one's personality, for example, to be rewired into one's previously
atrophied brain.
But surely it is Shewmon who is begging a critical question
here, for there is good reason to believe that person S's persisting
through time has nothing to do with S's personality or S's memory.
Peter van Inwagen, for example, has forcefully argued that human
organismic identity is sufficient for human personal identity.48 I find
his arguments there to be persuasive. Of course, I come to this debate
with the prior convictions both that human embryos have no memory
or personality at all, and that there is good reason to believe that they
are persons and that they persist through time.
IX.

I have been arguing both that the arguments against the
UDDA version of the WBDD put forth by thinkers like Veatch,
Shewmon, Lockwood, and Sorenson are not successful and that the
arguments presented in favor of HBODD alternatives likewise miss
their mark. In light of this double failure and in light of the deeply
counterintuitive consequences of this theory - e.g., in light of the
fact that Shewmon's HBODD implies that some nursing home
residents who are afflicted With Alzheimer's who move and vocalize
and eat and sleep are actually human cadavers; or in light of the fact
that, on Shewmon's view, some severely birth defective neonates are,
contrary to all appearances, the gestational products of stillbirths - I
recommend that this family of HBODsD of death be rejected. But as
I've already stated, I do not thereby advocate the UDDA's particular
conceptualization of whole-brain death. Rather, I have endeavored in
this essay to accomplish the more modest task of defending such
whole-brain conceptualizations of brain death against some of their
49
most severe and provocative "progressively minded" critics.
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